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Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Geoffrey Hodgson points out that the notion of ‘evolution’ is widely used 
in organization science without authors being sufficiently clear on what exactly they mean by this term. In 
his article, Hodgson cleans up the terminological and conceptual confusion on evolution in organization 
science and positions so-called ‘generalized Darwinism’ as the only well-elaborated evolutionary framework 
available in social science. We doubt, however, whether in its present form generalized Darwinism itself 
constitutes a viable approach. In this article we argue that Hodgson and collaborators so far have failed to 
show that generalized Darwinism is actually capable of serving as a basis for the construction of evolutionary 
explanations of social and organizational phenomena. We suggest a few items that should be put on 
generalized Darwinism’s research agenda in order to develop it towards a viable option.
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Introduction
In a recent article in this journal, Hodgson (2013) points out – correctly, we believe – that the 
notion of ‘evolution’ is widely used in organization science without authors being sufficiently clear 
on what exactly they mean by this term. As Hodgson writes, ‘Terms such as “evolution” or “co-
evolution” are often used with gravitas, as if they signify something important; but without further 
specification they actually mean very little. One is left asking what kind of evolutionary theory or 
meta-theoretical framework is intended’ (Hodgson, 2013, p. 974). Accordingly, Hodgson devotes 
much of his article to cleaning up the terminological and conceptual confusion on evolution, and 
especially Darwinian evolution, in organization science (Hodgson, 2013, pp. 973–974). In 
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addition, Hodgson aims to ‘indicate how the principles of generalized Darwinism can be useful as 
an overall framework for helping to understand organizational evolution’ (Hodgson, 2013, p. 974).
We very much appreciate this timely attempt to clean up conceptual confusions relating to the 
term ‘evolution’ in organization science. The use of evolutionary terminology in organization sci-
ence, as well as in the social sciences more generally, is indeed excessively booming and in many 
cases it remains unclear in what meaning terms are used.1 However, we are critical about the more 
innovative and constructive part of Hodgson’s work, a view he calls ‘generalized Darwinism’. This 
is a general conceptual framework that is based on the core principles of Darwinism and can be 
used as a basis for explaining change processes in complex population systems both within and 
outside the biological realm.2 Hodgson presents generalized Darwinism as a framework that is true 
to the original principles of Darwinism, as well as to more recent developments in biology, 
the philosophy of biology, and evolutionary economics. He positions generalized Darwinism 
as the only well-elaborated option available in the spectrum of evolutionarily motivated research 
programs in the social sciences, other usages of evolutionary concepts in social science being pro-
foundly underdeveloped. As Hodgson writes: ‘If generalized Darwinism is rejected, then what is 
intended by “evolution” or “coevolution” must be clearly specified. In fact, no viable alternative 
general conceptual framework for addressing evolution in complex population systems exists’ 
(Hodgson, 2013, p. 974).
While it may well be the case that other frameworks in the social sciences that use evolutionary 
notions are even less viable than generalized Darwinism, we doubt whether at this point general-
ized Darwinism itself constitutes a viable option. In what follows, we highlight some items that 
proponents of generalized Darwinism should place on their research agenda in order to establish 
that their approach actually has a role to play in the investigation of social and organizational 
phenomena.
Challenges for Generalized Darwinism
At present, three main lines of work can be distinguished in evolutionary thinking about economic 
and organizational phenomena: the Neo-Schumpeterian school (e.g. Nelson, 1995, 2006, 2007; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982, 2002), the line of work based on Witt’s so-called ‘continuity hypothesis’ 
(e.g. Cordes, 2006, 2007; Witt, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008) and generalized Darwinism. One impor-
tant aspect on which these three approaches show considerable differences is the way they con-
ceive of the relation of their own theoretical framework to biological evolutionary theory. Of these 
three approaches, only generalized Darwinism rests on the assumption that evolutionary processes 
of the same sort as are found in the biological realm actually occur in the social world.
For example, Nelson and Winter have long taken a view of evolutionary economics and evolu-
tionary social science as mainly involving analogies with biology that are useful for heuristic pur-
poses but should not be stretched beyond heuristic contexts. For Nelson and Winter, we may talk 
about social phenomena using evolutionary terminology but should not take this to indicate that 
evolution actually occurs in the social domain. Proponents of the continuity hypothesis view the 
relation between biological evolution and socio-economic evolution in a different manner. On this 
view, an evolutionary approach in social science is warranted because evolution in the socio-
economic realm (as a cultural phenomenon) emerged from the biological evolution of humankind 
and in this sense is continuous with it, although socio-economic evolution has developed into a 
different sort of process from biological evolution. Therefore, it should be possible to draw lessons 
from biological evolution that might help us understand the processes and products of socio-eco-
nomic evolution, while keeping in mind that the two sorts of evolutionary processes are quite 
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distinct kinds of processes that do not fit into a common description. Hodgson and collaborators 
strongly oppose both these views. Against the neo-Schumpeterian view they propose that evolu-
tionary social science should go beyond the drawing of mere analogies toward the development of 
a general evolutionary theory from which specific explanations can be derived for specific phe-
nomena in specific domain. Against the continuity hypothesis they hold a view of biological and 
socio-economic evolution as – admittedly distinct – processes that, notwithstanding their many 
differences, still can be understood within the same general theoretical framework as special cases 
of the same general process. Hodgson’s project, then, is to elaborate a general theory of evolution-
ary processes – in the biological realm, in the social realm and elsewhere – based on the core 
principles and concepts of Darwinism.
Similarly to evolutionary biology, generalized Darwinism seeks to explain the evolution of 
populations that consist of similar but non-identical entities that face locally scarce resources and 
problems of survival, and have the ability to reproduce. The entities in question can be biological 
entities (as generalized Darwinism is supposed to cover all instances of evolutionary processes, 
wherever these occur), but also organizations and other kinds of entities. Hodgson and collabora-
tors emphasize in their publications that such evolving populations include populations of business 
firms (Hodgson, 2013, p. 978), such that generalized Darwinism can serve as the foundation of 
business studies from an evolutionary perspective. The project is supported by an ontological 
claim. It ‘relies on the claim of common abstract features in both the social and the biological 
world’ (Hodgson, 2013, p. 978; also Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 579), that is, the claim that there is ‘a 
degree of ontological communality, at a high level of abstraction and not at the level of detail’ 
(Hodgson, 2013, p. 978) between biological and social evolution. This ontological commonality 
pertains to the three core processes of Darwinian evolution – replication, selection and variation 
(Hodgson, 2013, p. 978) – as well as the basic kinds of entities participating in evolutionary pro-
cesses – replicators and interactors (Hodgson, 2013, pp. 976–978). Wherever these processes and 
entities are found, Hodgson and collaborators claim, Darwinian evolution inevitably occurs.
A first point of criticism we want to put forward is that proponents of generalized Darwinism 
are insufficiently clear when it comes to naming the actual explananda that are in focus. It is not 
spelled out in any detail what kind of phenomena generalized Darwinism aims to explain, other 
than that it seeks to explain the evolution of populations of, in the present case, organizations and 
business firms. Of course, Hodgson (in his various publications on the topic) provides clues by 
stating that generalized Darwinism’s purpose is to explain change processes in industries 
(Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 583; Hodgson, 2013, p. 978; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a, pp. 4–5; 
Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010, pp. 34, 40). But that is more or less all that is being said. The ques-
tion then remains what kind of change phenomena exactly generalized Darwinism aims to 
explain. There are indeed many possibilities. For instance, organizational ecology, a well-known 
research programme in organization science that many authors conceive of as being built on 
Darwinian foundations (and that Hodgson refers to as a seminal line of work in the Darwinian 
spirit in organization science) addresses at least four comparatively well-articulated explananda, 
namely: organizational diversity; distributions of organizations across different social and eco-
nomic environments; limitations imposed on possible organizational forms by their environ-
ments; and rates of organizational establishment, change and termination (see Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977, 1984; Reydon & Scholz, 2009, p. 415).
Interestingly, not all explananda of organizational ecology seem to be in focus in Hodgson’s 
approach. Only the latter of the four explananda mentioned above concerns change processes 
themselves, while the other three concern the product of such processes and their boundary condi-
tions. One thus may wonder whether generalized Darwinism is intentionally conceived as 
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narrower with respect to its explanatory scope than other evolution-based lines of work in social 
and organization science. If this narrower scope is intended, then why is this? The two principal 
explananda of biological evolutionary theory are the extant diversity of organisms and their adapt-
edness to life in their particular environments (e.g. Charlesworth & Charlesworth, 2003; Van Dijk 
& Reydon, 2010, p. 658). So it can be expected that these two explananda – or their counterparts 
in the social/organizational domain – should also be in focus in generalized Darwinism. That is, it 
seems reasonable to expect that generalized Darwinism should be able to explain both evolutionary 
processes in the social domain and aspects of their products (i.e. diversity and adaptedness). In the 
case that these explananda are in focus and the explanatory scope of generalized Darwinism is not 
intended to be narrower than that of other evolutionary lines of investigation, the next step would 
be to establish that generalized Darwinism has the resources to explain the phenomena it is intended 
to explain. Elsewhere (Reydon & Scholz, 2009; Scholz & Reydon 2008, 2010) we have criticized 
organizational ecology for not being able to provide proper evolutionary explanations of its 
explananda and we believe that our basic criticism of organizational ecology holds against general-
ized Darwinism too. (We will turn to this issue in the next section.) But in the case of generalized 
Darwinism the additional problem occurs that in the absence of clearly circumscribed explananda 
it becomes difficult to assess whether generalized Darwinism will be able to achieve its 
explanatory aims.
It is possible, of course, that at this point we expect too much from generalized Darwinism. 
Perhaps generalized Darwinism is still in a very early stage of its development and more detailed 
accounts will be forthcoming. Moreover, Hodgson and collaborators repeatedly state that they do 
not intend to develop a detailed evolutionary theory for the social/organizational domain, but rather 
a general, overarching framework based on the principles of Darwinian evolution that itself is non-
explanatory but within which explanations for concrete domains can be formulated by filling in the 
relevant details (Aldrich et al., 2008, pp. 580, 585; Hodgson, 2002, p. 273; Hodgson, 2013). But 
even if we grant all this, there remains (at least) one severe problem for generalized Darwinism that 
its proponents should place on their research agenda. This problem has to do with a central aspect 
of the ontology of evolution, namely, the nature of evolving populations.
At the heart of Hodgson’s project lies the assumption that populations of organizations can be 
studied by using general Darwinian principles (Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 582; Hodgson, 2013, p. 978; 
Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006, p. 6, 16; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010, p. 34). These populations consist 
of organizations of a certain type, where organization types are defined by particular key aspects in 
which their members resemble one another. As Hodgson (2013, p. 978) specifies, the populations 
of organizations, within which evolutionary processes occur, are defined as ‘sets of individually 
different and demarcated entities that interact with the environment and each other’. In the case of 
populations of organizations and firms, organizational types are defined by distinctive capacities 
organizations have to deal with scarcity of resources and competition against various other entities. 
Such capacities, proponents of generalized Darwinism claim, are inherited.
The problem, now, is this. Contrary to the definition of organizational populations as sets of 
organizations sharing a number of traits, in evolutionary biology populations are conceived of as 
reproductive communities, i.e. systems of reproductively interconnected organisms.3 Biological 
populations are not defined as sets of organisms with a number of traits in common. From the per-
spective of generalized Darwinism, any member of a particular organizational population must 
exhibit the particular traits that define the population. But then variation within organizational 
populations – one of the driving factors in evolution, as Hodgson (2013, p. 978) rightly states – is 
quite limited: the members of an organizational population cannot vary too much with respect to 
the population’s defining traits. Thus, novelties can only occur to a limited degree within an 
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organizational population: any novelty regarding the cluster of traits that defines the population 
can easily entail that the organization bearing the new trait no longer is a member of the population. 
Thus, minor innovations can occur, but no really new kinds of organization can come into being as 
a consequence of evolution within an existing population. Innovation can occur in non-evolutionary 
ways, of course. But such innovations cannot be explained by invoking evolution.
As a consequence of its definition of organizational populations in terms of shared key traits of 
their member organizations the explanatory force of generalized Darwinism seems severely lim-
ited. Our challenge to proponents of generalized Darwinism thus is to formulate a definition of 
organizational populations that is compatible with the Darwinian view of evolution and to examine 
whether a framework results that can explain organizational change in the same way as biological 
Darwinism explains organismal change.
Conclusion
On the one hand the possibility that evolutionary processes in a strict sense could also occur in in 
realms outside biology, such as the organizational domain, should not be rejected without further 
investigation. On the other hand, however, it should not be simply assumed that such processes can 
and actually do occur outside the living world. Evolution in the strict sense might or might not be 
a process that is confined to the living world – ultimately this is an empirical issue. But even if 
evolutionary processes do occur outside the living world, it cannot be assumed without further 
argumentation that it will be possible to formulate a general description of all the various evolu-
tionary processes, of the sort envisaged by proponents of generalized Darwinism, that will be able 
to do actual heuristic, explanatory, etc. work in investigative contexts.
In our view, attempts at formulating theories of evolution that go beyond the biological domain 
should be welcomed in principle. After all, showing that the same basic process occurs in widely 
divergent realms and that the same theory can be used to explain different kinds of phenomena in 
divergent domains is an important aspect of progress in science. And in case the existence of deep 
commonalities between biological and organizational evolution is established, it could be possible 
to use results from evolutionary biology (mathematical models developed for evolving populations 
of living organisms, for instance) to study phenomena in the organizational domain. However, 
treating a variety of phenomena that are dissimilar under an overarching framework may also lead 
investigative efforts astray by propagating a misconceived view of (at least some of) the phenom-
ena under consideration. Thus, a good measure of caution is called for not to invoke Darwinian 
evolutionary theory too quickly to describe and explain phenomena outside the original scope of 
the theory.
So the question arises on whose side the burden of proof is to be placed: with those advocating 
the generalization of Darwinism or with those, like us, who suggest caution? We think it lies with 
those who make the positive claim that change in the organizational domain is Darwinian in any 
proper sense of the term. Any attempt at establishing a generalized evolutionary theory we believe 
should include a demonstration – by means of thoroughly elaborated examples – that the processes 
in the various domains which the theory is supposed to cover are sufficiently similar in order to be 
considered local instantiations of the same general process. We have pointed to some of the issues 
that have to be clarified before generalized Darwinism could serve as the basis for a research 
agenda in organization science, as Hodgson intends it to be. Elaborating generalized Darwinism 
further with respect to these issues in our view constitutes a necessary – but probably not yet suf-
ficient – requirement for the approach to be able to count as a serious option for researchers in 
organization science and the social sciences more broadly.
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Notes
1. As a recent bibliometic study shows, the mass of evolutionarily inspired literature in economic fields of 
research has shown a sharp increase in the past 20–25 years (Silva & Teixeira, 2009).
2. Hodgson and collaborators elaborated generalized Darwinism in a number of publications, including 
Aldrich et al. (2008), Hodgson (2002, 2003) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 
2010).
3. We have developed this argument with respect to the specific research programme of organizational 
ecology elsewhere (Reydon & Scholz, 2009; Scholz & Reydon, 2008, 2010). The problem that general-
ized Darwinism faces is essentially the same as that faced by organizational ecology. As we have spelled 
out the issue in other publications, here we give only a brief summary.
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